# PAN-OS SSL/TLS decryption — inspect, then prove it

Source: https://ai.techclick.in/blog_paloalto_ssl_decryption
Markdown: https://ai.techclick.in/blog_paloalto_ssl_decryption.md
Publisher: Techclick Infosec Pvt Ltd

PAN-OS SSL/TLS decryption the way you will use it: Forward Proxy vs Inbound, No-Decrypt vs pinned-app exclusion, Forward Trust, and proof in Traffic + Decryption logs.

Quick answer (say this out loud)

   PAN-OS decryption is  policy-based . Users leaving the network to the internet match  SSL Forward Proxy : the NGFW opens two TLS sessions and presents a  Forward Trust  impersonation cert (or  Forward Untrust  if the real issuer is not in its CTL). Traffic arriving at  your  server matches  SSL Inbound Inspection : import that server’s certificate and private key. Traffic you  choose  not to decrypt (finance, health, executives) is a  No Decrypt  rule at the  top  of  Policies → Decryption , with a No Decryption profile on TLSv1.2 and earlier. Traffic that  cannot  be decrypted (pinned certs, client authentication) goes on  Device → Certificate Management → SSL Decryption Exclusion . Prove it in  Monitor → Logs → Decryption  (Policy Name, Proxy Type, TLS version, cipher, Error Index) and  Monitor → Logs → Traffic  ( Decrypted = yes ).

## 1. Why encrypted traffic is still a hole

 A Security allow with a profile group does not inspect what it cannot see. Most web sessions are TLS. Without a matching decryption policy, App-ID often stays on  ssl , URL Filtering cannot apply HTTPS exceptions cleanly, and Advanced Threat Prevention / WildFire never see the payload.

 Official wording is blunt: you cannot block traffic you do not inspect. That is why decryption is its own rulebase —  Policies → Decryption  — evaluated top-down, first match, separate from Security.

   Hero · who talks to whom

   Notice: the client is not talking to the real server. The NGFW is a trusted third party with two TLS sessions. If the client does not trust Forward Trust, every site warns.

 Three tickets this page is built to close:

- “HTTPS is broken after we turned decrypt on.” Usually a missing Forward Trust on the endpoint, a pinned app, or a No Decrypt rule sitting below a decrypt-any.

- “SOC still cannot see the payload.” Usually the session never matched a Decrypt rule, or QUIC bypassed TLS, or you only logged unsuccessful handshakes.

- “Our public site is being scanned through the firewall and we imported nothing.” That is Inbound Inspection, not Forward Proxy. You need the server cert and private key on the NGFW.

   Hard words before the runbook

    SSL Forward Proxy  — outbound MITM. Firewall impersonates the internet server to the client.

    SSL Inbound Inspection  — inbound MITM. Firewall has your server’s cert + key and inspects clients talking to that server.

    Forward Trust / Forward Untrust  — the two impersonation CAs. Trust = “server issuer is in our CTL.” Untrust = “we do not trust that issuer; client must warn.”

    No Decrypt  — policy action you choose (legal / privacy). Still a decryption policy rule so the session is logged.

    SSL Decryption Exclusion  — hostname list for traffic that  breaks  if you decrypt (pinning, client auth). Technical, not legal.

## 2. Mental model · two sessions + two certs

 Hold three parts. Interviews fail when people mix them.

#### 1. Two TLS sessions

     Client ↔ NGFW and NGFW ↔ server. New session keys on each side. The NGFW decrypts, applies Security + profiles, then re-encrypts. HA does not sync decrypted sessions.

#### 2. The cert the client sees

     Forward Proxy: impersonation signed by Forward Trust or Forward Untrust. Inbound: the real server cert (or chain) you imported. If the client already pinned the real leaf, this session dies.

#### 3. Policy, then profile

     The decryption rule picks Decrypt / No Decrypt and the Type. The attached decryption profile is the checks (expired cert, weak TLS, unsupported cipher). No profile = you decrypted without hardening.

   Say this out loud

   Forward Trust on the client is how the user stays silent. Forward Untrust on the client is how you hide a bad issuer. Pinned apps go on the Exclusion list. Finance goes on a No Decrypt rule above the decrypt rule. The Decryption log Policy Name is the evidence — not the Security rule name.

   Journey · handshake the firewall actually runs

   Client Hello hits the NGFW first. The server never sees the client cert store. The client never sees the real leaf unless you are doing Inbound Inspection.

 Forward Proxy handshake, official order:

- Internal client starts TLS to an external server.

- NGFW intercepts the certificate request and acts as the server to the client.

- NGFW opens a second session to the real server and looks like the client.

- If the server cert is signed by a CA in the NGFW CTL and the profile allows it, the NGFW mints a Forward Trust impersonation cert (SAN copied / CN appended if you enabled that check).

- If the issuer is not trusted, the NGFW mints a Forward Untrust copy. The client must warn. That warning is the feature.

- Keys are proxied the same way. Cleartext is inspected. Traffic is re-encrypted on the way out.

## 3. Decision flowchart

 Read this before you click  Policies → Decryption . The packet does not “find the safest mode.” It walks the decryption rulebase until one rule says Decrypt or No Decrypt.

   Path · four exits

   Four exits, not two. Legal skip and technical break are different doors. Mixing them is how a pinned app becomes a “finance category” hole.

   Flow 1 · pick the door, then the object

       PAN-OS decryption decision: outbound, inbound, no-decrypt, exclusion

- Encrypted session arrives · which door? New TLS / SSH session zones + SNI / dest + user Who owns the server cert? We do (inbound) Inbound Inspection import cert + key Internet does Forward Proxy if we will inspect Can / may we decrypt? Legal / privacy No Decrypt rule top of rulebase Pinned / client-auth SSL Exclusion list hostname, technical YES · inspect Decrypt + decryption profile then Security policy + profile group on Allow No Decrypt and Exclusion sit above decrypt-any. First match in Policies → Decryption wins — same as Security. Undecrypted traffic is silent in the Decryption log unless a decryption policy rule owns it. Read top → down. Diamond = decision. Green is inspect. Amber is a chosen skip. Red is a technical skip. Both skips must exist as objects or the decrypt-any below will still fire. ## 4. How to choose the mode Mode is a Type on the Options tab, not a Security action. Mixing Forward Proxy with an imported server key is the classic “inbound never decrypts” ticket. You need Type / action What you attach Why Users in trust browsing the internet Decrypt · SSL Forward Proxy Forward Trust + Forward Untrust; SSL Forward Proxy profile NGFW impersonates the destination. Clients must trust Forward Trust only. Internet clients hitting your published HTTPS server Decrypt · SSL Inbound Inspection Server cert + private key (up to 12 certs per rule); inbound profile NGFW must present the same leaf the server presents. PFS + chain: import the chain. Finance, health, executives — you choose not to look No Decrypt No Decryption profile (TLSv1.2 and earlier only) Legal / privacy. Place this rule above decrypt. Still logs if the rule exists. Banking app, dropbox-style pin, client-auth site breaks Leave Decrypt rules alone SSL Decryption Exclusion hostname (or predefined PAN list) Technical. A No Decrypt URL category will not fix a pin on a hostname the category missed. Mobile apps that pin + TLSv1.3 No Decrypt for those apps, or Max Version = TLSv1.2 on their profile Separate rule + profile TLSv1.3 encrypts certificate data, so automatic exclusion by cert info cannot run. SSH port-forward tunnels Decrypt · SSH Proxy SSH Proxy profile (no certs) Not on Strata Cloud Manager. Distinguishes ssh vs ssh-tunnel . Source: Decryption Policy Rules and Define Traffic to Decrypt — “Place rules that exclude traffic from decryption at the top.” Technical breaks go on the SSL decryption exclusion list, not a legal No Decrypt rule. Do not do this Do not install the Forward Untrust certificate into any client trust store. Official Configure SSL Forward Proxy: users will stop seeing warnings for issuers the NGFW itself does not trust. Do not attach a No Decryption profile to TLSv1.3 No Decrypt rules — certificate fields are encrypted, so expired-cert / untrusted-issuer checks cannot fire. Still create the No Decrypt rule so the session is logged. ## 5. Runbook · Side A certs, Side B rule, Side C log Lab story (placeholder IPs only): users in zone trust (10.1.8.0/24) browse HTTPS to untrust . You will not decrypt financial-services or health-and-medicine . A pinned lab hostname pin.lab.example.com must keep working. Then you prove one decrypted session and one no-decrypt session in logs. Primary source for clicks: Configure SSL Forward Proxy (PAN-OS & Panorama) and Define Traffic to Decrypt . ### Side A — certificates and exclusions first #### Confirm the data-plane path can proxy Network → Interfaces → Ethernet . Forward Proxy needs Virtual Wire, Layer 2, or Layer 3 — not a tap you only use for Inbound visibility. Proxied Forward Proxy traffic does not carry DSCP / QoS.

- #### Forward Trust (best practice: enterprise CA) Device → Certificate Management → Certificates (labeled Device Certificates on PAN-OS 11.2 and earlier) → Generate . Unique Certificate Name per firewall. Common Name = FQDN or IP, no spaces. Signed By = External Authority (CSR) for an enterprise CA, or a self-signed root you mark Trusted Root CA then a subordinate with Certificate Authority checked. After import, open the cert and check Forward Trust Certificate . Enterprise-CA path: skip pushing the leaf to endpoints if they already trust that enterprise root. Self-signed path: export PEM without the private key and deploy via GPO / MDM / GlobalProtect Trusted Root CA + Install in Local Root Certificate Store .

- #### Forward Untrust (same cert on every firewall) Generate a separate CA. Leave Signed By blank. Check Certificate Authority , then mark Forward Untrust Certificate . Do not export it. Do not install it on clients.

- #### Technical exclusion for the pinned hostname Device → Certificate Management → SSL Decryption Exclusion → Add . Hostname pin.lab.example.com . This is the official door for certificate pinning and client authentication. Predefined Palo Alto Networks exclusions already cover many vendor sites — do not delete those rows.

- #### Decryption profiles Objects → Decryption Profile → Add . Build three, not one: dp-fwd-strict — SSL Forward Proxy + SSL Protocol Settings. Min Version TLSv1.2 (or TLSv1.3 if you have no pinned mobile apps on this rule). Max Version = Max . Leave DHE + ECDHE on. Block expired certificates, untrusted issuers, unsupported versions and ciphers.

- dp-no-decrypt — No Decryption tab: Block sessions with expired certificates + Block sessions with untrusted issuers. Attach only to TLSv1.2-and-earlier No Decrypt rules.

- (If you publish a server later) dp-inbound — SSL Inbound Inspection checks matching what that server actually supports. Separate profile per capability set (RSA-only vs PFS).

     https://fw.lab.example.com/#device/certificate-management/certificates
     Training mock · not live

       Device → Certificate Management → Certificates → fw1-fwd-trust

### Certificate Information

          Certificate Name  fw1-fwd-trust

          Common Name  fw1.lab.example.com

          Signed By  corp-root-ca (enterprise)

          Usage flags  Forward Trust Certificate · checked

          Key / CA  Key = yes · CA = yes

          Forward Untrust on this object?  cleared — different cert

         Export PEM · no private key
         OK

    Click next:  generate  lab-fwd-untrust , mark only Forward Untrust, do not export it. Then Objects → Decryption Profile. Source: Device → Certificate Management → Certificates (Configure SSL Forward Proxy, PAN-OS).

### Side B — Policies → Decryption

- #### No Decrypt first (position 1) Policies → Decryption → Add . Name no-decrypt-finance-health . Source Zone = trust . Destination Zone = untrust . Service/URL Category: URL Category = financial-services , health-and-medicine (predefined). Options : Action = No Decrypt . Decryption Profile = dp-no-decrypt . Log unsuccessful TLS handshakes (default); also check Log Successful TLS Handshakes on the pilot so you can prove the skip.

- #### Forward Proxy second (position 2) Name decrypt-users-fwd . Source Zone = trust , Source Address = net-users-trust (10.1.8.0/24). Destination Zone = untrust . Service = any (or application-default if you are excluding apps on default ports only). URL Category = any — the No Decrypt rule above already carved finance/health. Options : Action = Decrypt , Type = SSL Forward Proxy , Decryption Profile = dp-fwd-strict . Enable Log Successful TLS Handshakes on the pilot.

- #### Optional inbound later A third rule, Type = SSL Inbound Inspection , Destination Address = the published server, Certificates = the imported server leaf (and the next leaf before cutover — up to 12). Do not put Forward Trust here. The NGFW checks that the Server Hello cert matches a cert on the rule; mismatch ends the session and the Decryption log says so.

- #### Block QUIC so browsers fall back to TLS This is a Policies → Security pair, not a decryption rule. Block application quic , and block UDP services 80 and 443. Official best practice: Chrome will otherwise stay on proprietary encryption the NGFW cannot decrypt.

- #### Commit Decryption policy is not live until Commit. Generate one subordinate Forward Trust per firewall so a revoke does not take down the fleet.

     https://fw.lab.example.com/#policies/decryption
     Training mock · not live

       Policies → Decryption → Add

### Decryption Policy Rule

         General
         Source
         Destination
         Service/URL Category
         Options

          Name (General)  decrypt-users-fwd

          Position  2 · below no-decrypt-finance-health

          Source Zone / Address  trust · net-users-trust

          Destination Zone  untrust

          Action  Decrypt

          Type  SSL Forward Proxy

          Decryption Profile  dp-fwd-strict

          Log Setting  Successful + unsuccessful TLS handshakes

         Cancel
         OK · then Commit

    Click next:  OK, Commit, browse HTTPS from 10.1.8.41, then open Monitor → Logs → Decryption. Source: Policies → Decryption (Define Traffic to Decrypt, PAN-OS).

### Side C — prove it in Traffic + Decryption logs

- #### Generate two sessions From 10.1.8.41: fetch a normal HTTPS site (should decrypt) and a financial-category site (should no-decrypt). Leave the pinned hostname for a third pass if you have it.

- #### Traffic log — Decrypted flag Monitor → Logs → Traffic . Filter (addr.src in 10.1.8.41) . On the decrypted session: Application should move off bare ssl once identified, Action = allow, and the Decrypted column = yes. On the finance session: Decrypted = no, and the Security rule still allowed it.

- #### Decryption log — the close Monitor → Logs → Decryption . This log exists only for sessions a decryption policy rule owns (including No Decrypt). Quote Policy Name , Proxy Type (forward / no-decrypt / inbound), TLS Version , cipher / key-exchange, SNI, Root Status, and on failures the Error / Error Index .

     https://fw.lab.example.com/#monitor/logs/decryption
     Training mock · not live

       Monitor → Logs → Decryption

### Decryption · filter (addr.src in 10.1.8.41)

        13:12:04  sni=news.example.com policy= decrypt-users-fwd  proxy= forward  tls= TLS1.3  decrypted= yes  root=trusted

        13:12:11  sni=bank.example.com policy= no-decrypt-finance-health  proxy= no-decrypt  tls=TLS1.2 decrypted= no  root=uninspected

        13:11:58  sni=pin.lab.example.com policy=decrypt-users-fwd error= received fatal alert  · add hostname to SSL Decryption Exclusion

         Export CSV
         Add to filter · policy_name eq decrypt-users-fwd

    Green close:  Policy Name is yours, Proxy Type matches the Options tab, TLS version is what you intended, Error Index is empty on the happy path. Source: Configure Decryption Logging + Decryption Log Errors.

   Green success = these fields

   Monitor → Logs → Decryption:  policy_name=decrypt-users-fwd  ·  proxy_type=forward  · TLS 1.2 or 1.3 · no Error Index. Same source in Traffic:  Decrypted=yes , Application is a real App-ID at session end, Action = allow. Finance session:  policy_name=no-decrypt-finance-health ,  Decrypted=no . Pinned hostname: either Exclusion cache / list, or a handshake error you then exclude — not a second decrypt rule.

   Ops · proof cockpit

   Commit is not proof. A Decryption log row with your Policy Name is proof. Default logging is unsuccessful handshakes only — turn on successful for the pilot.

   CLI filters you will actually type
 show session all filter source 10.1.8.41 destination-port 443
show log decryption direction equal backward receive_time in last-hour
show log traffic direction equal backward ( addr.src in 10.1.8.41 ) and ( decrypted eq yes )

## 6. Runtime path after commit

 After go-live the firewall does not re-read your intent. It does this.

   Flow 2 · session after commit

       Runtime path of a PAN-OS TLS session against decryption policy

- One TLS session · exclude, match, proxy, inspect, log 1 · Ingress zone + Client Hello SNI if visible 2 · Exclusion list predefined + custom hostname / pin 3 · Decrypt rule top-down first match Decrypt / No Decrypt 4 · Two sessions + profile Trust or Untrust impersonation or imported inbound leaf 5 · Cleartext → Security + profiles App-ID / URL / Threat / WildFire then re-encrypt toward dest or skip inspect No Decrypt / Exclusion / QUIC Security still matches — payload dark Logs write only if a decryption policy rule owns the session Default = unsuccessful handshakes. Pilot = also log successful. Root Status = uninspected on no-decrypt and many TLS1.3 skips. URL Filtering reset during handshake never appears in Decryption logs — look in URL Filtering logs instead. HA failover: decrypted sessions are not synced. New sessions decrypt again after the fail-over. Security policy still runs on undecrypted traffic. You get an allow/deny, not a payload. That is why “the Security rule hit” is not proof of inspection. ## 7. Traps + proof checklist Trap What you see What is true Forward Trust never landed on the client Every HTTPS site warns after commit Self-signed path needs GPO/MDM/GlobalProtect. Enterprise-CA path needs the subordinate marked Forward Trust, not the root. Forward Untrust in the trust store No warnings on junk issuers You taught the browser to trust what the NGFW itself does not trust. Remove it. No Decrypt below decrypt-any Finance is still decrypted Decryption rules are first match. Move the skip to the top. Pinned app treated as a URL category skip App still dies; category never matched Use Device → Certificate Management → SSL Decryption Exclusion (hostname). Technical ≠ legal. No Decryption profile on TLSv1.3 Expired / untrusted issuer still allowed Certificate fields are encrypted. Profile checks cannot run. Keep the No Decrypt rule for logging. Inbound without the private key Session end = firewall/server certificate mismatch Import cert + key (and chain for TLS1.2 + intermediates). Add the next cert before you swap the server leaf. QUIC allowed Chrome works, Decrypted = no, App-ID stays empty-ish Block quic and UDP/80+443 so the browser falls back to TLS. Only unsuccessful handshakes logged Happy path is invisible Options → Log Successful TLS Handshakes on the pilot. Watch Device → Setup → Management → Logging and Reporting Settings quota (default decryption log is 1%). Client authentication / pin + proxy Fatal alert, Local SSL Decryption Exclusion Cache grows NGFW is a proxy — it cannot do true mutual TLS. Exclude the hostname or block client-auth in the profile if the app is not required. Pilot checklist before you call it done Forward Trust is on the client trust store (or enterprise root already is). Forward Untrust is not.

- No Decrypt (legal) sits above Decrypt. Pinned hostnames are on SSL Decryption Exclusion.

- Each decrypt / no-decrypt rule has the matching decryption profile. No “naked” Decrypt action.

- QUIC is blocked in Security. Successful TLS handshakes are logged on the pilot rules.

- One live decrypt: Decryption log Policy Name + Proxy Type = forward, Traffic Decrypted = yes.

- One live skip: same logs show No Decrypt (or Exclusion) and Decrypted = no.

## Knowledge check

   Six judgment items. Same facts as the runbook. Check answers, then reset if you mixed No Decrypt with the Exclusion list or put Untrust in a trust store.

       Q1
       Users in zone  trust  browse HTTPS on the internet. You want Threat and URL inspection of that payload. Which Options tab do you set on  Policies → Decryption ?

           Action = Decrypt, Type = SSL Forward Proxy
           Action = Decrypt, Type = SSL Inbound Inspection, and import Forward Trust as the server cert
           Action = No Decrypt, and attach an SSL Forward Proxy profile so expired certs still block
           No decryption rule — a Security allow with a profile group is enough to see HTTPS payloads

       Correct:  a . Outbound users to the internet is SSL Forward Proxy. Inbound Inspection is for traffic to  your  server using  that  server’s cert + key. Security profiles cannot inspect ciphertext. Re-read How to choose + mental model.

       Q2
       A junior engineer exports the Forward Untrust CA and GPO-installs it into every laptop’s Trusted Root store “so users stop complaining.” What did they just break?

           Nothing — Untrust must be on the client or Forward Proxy cannot impersonate trusted sites
           Inbound Inspection, because Untrust is the only cert that can match a Server Hello
           The warning path: clients will now trust issuers the NGFW itself does not trust
           Decryption logs, because Untrust certificates cannot be written to Monitor → Logs

       Correct:  c . Official Configure SSL Forward Proxy: do not install Forward Untrust on clients. The warning is how users see that the real issuer is untrusted. Re-read Side A + traps.

       Q3
       A corporate banking app dies the minute you commit  decrypt-users-fwd . The vendor documents certificate pinning. Finance URL category does not match the API hostname. First fix?

           Move the decrypt rule above all other decryption rules so it matches first
           Add the API hostname on Device → Certificate Management → SSL Decryption Exclusion
           Attach a No Decryption profile to decrypt-users-fwd and set Min Version to TLSv1.3
           Import the bank’s public leaf as Forward Trust so the impersonation matches the pin

       Correct:  b . Pinning is a technical break. Official door is the SSL Decryption Exclusion list, not a legal No Decrypt category and not “make the impersonation equal the pin.” Re-read decision flow + Side A step 4.

       Q4
       You created  no-decrypt-finance-health  and attached  dp-no-decrypt  (block expired + untrusted issuer). Traffic is TLSv1.3. Users still reach a bank with an expired chain. Why did the profile not save you?

           No Decrypt rules never log, so the profile cannot fire
           You must set Type = SSL Forward Proxy on a No Decrypt rule for certificate checks to run
           Expired certificates are only blocked on Inbound Inspection
           TLSv1.3 encrypts certificate information, so a No Decryption profile cannot see issuer or expiry

       Correct:  d . Official Decryption Profiles: do not attach a No Decryption profile to TLSv1.3 traffic you skip — the checks have no certificate data. Still keep the No Decrypt  rule  so the session is logged. Re-read How to choose + traps.

       Q5
       How do you prove  decrypt-users-fwd  actually inspected 10.1.8.41 → news.example.com?

           Commit succeeded and Policies → Decryption shows the rule enabled — that is the proof
           Monitor → Logs → Decryption shows Policy Name = decrypt-users-fwd, Proxy Type = forward; Traffic shows Decrypted = yes
           Traffic log Application = ssl at session start is enough; do not open Decryption logs
           If Security rule allow-users-web-dns hit, decryption must have run

       Correct:  b . Decryption log Policy Name is the decryption rule that won. Traffic Decrypted = yes is the session flag. A Security hit only proves allow/deny. Re-read Side C + green success.

       Q6
        decrypt-users-fwd  (Decrypt, any URL) sits at position 1.  no-decrypt-finance-health  sits at position 4. After commit, bank.example.com is still decrypted. First fix?

           Move the No Decrypt rule above the decrypt-any rule (first match in the decryption rulebase)
           Change the decrypt rule Type from SSL Forward Proxy to SSH Proxy
           Attach Forward Untrust to the No Decrypt rule so the bank session warns and stops
           Disable Log Successful TLS Handshakes so finance sessions fall out of the decrypt path

       Correct:  a . Official Define Traffic to Decrypt: exclude rules at the top; decryption policy is evaluated top to bottom. Logging does not change match. Re-read decision flow + Side B.

       Check answers
       Reset

## Sources

- Decryption Basics — policy-based decrypt of outbound (Forward Proxy) and inbound (Inbound Inspection); you cannot block what you do not inspect.

- SSL Forward Proxy — two sessions, impersonation cert, Forward Trust vs Forward Untrust handshake steps.

- SSL Inbound Inspection — import server cert + key; up to 12 certs; TLS1.3 sends the same chain the server sent; mismatch ends the session.

- Keys and Certificates for Decryption Policies — Forward Trust, Forward Untrust, inbound server certs, SAN copy, PFS (DHE/ECDHE).

- Configure SSL Forward Proxy — Device → Certificate Management; enterprise CA vs self-signed; never install Untrust on clients; Policies → Decryption Type = SSL Forward Proxy.

- Define Traffic to Decrypt — Policies → Decryption → Add; Options Action / Type; exclude rules at the top; QUIC block; pinning → exclusion list.

- Decryption Profiles — Objects → Decryption Profile; No Decryption profile not for TLSv1.3; SSL Protocol Settings Min/Max; mobile pin + TLS1.3 note.

- Exclude a Server from Decryption for Technical Reasons — SSL Decryption Exclusion for pinning / client auth (vs policy-based legal skip).

- Configure Decryption Logging — logs only for sessions a decryption rule owns, including No Decrypt; default = unsuccessful handshakes; Log Successful TLS Handshakes; 1% default quota.

- Decryption Log Errors and Error Indexes — Root Status uninspected on no-decrypt and some TLS1.3; filter examples.

- Deploy SSL Decryption Using Best Practices — No Decrypt above decrypt; no No-Decrypt profile on TLS1.3; Max Version TLS1.2 for many mobile pins.

 Related:  PAN-OS Security policy  ·  PAN-OS session factory  ·  Traffic not passing  ·  Logging and reporting  ·  Palo Alto interview hub  ·  Palo Alto course

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