# Shared responsibility: AWS secures the cloud, IAM is your perimeter

Source: https://ai.techclick.in/blog_aws_shared_responsibility_iam
Markdown: https://ai.techclick.in/blog_aws_shared_responsibility_iam.md
Publisher: Techclick Infosec Pvt Ltd

AWS secures the cloud; you secure in the cloud. IAM is the perimeter. Root is not a daily user. Dummy 111122223333.

## The ticket

 Priya’s laptop has a screenshot of the root console for account  111122223333 . Yesterday she created  sg-web  as root. Today the same password is in a shared chat. That is not an AWS outage. That is you handing over the account.

  Quick interview answer

 AWS Shared Responsibility Model: AWS secures the  cloud  (regions, hardware, hypervisor, managed-service plane). You secure  in  the cloud — customer data, IAM, guest OS, security groups, encryption choices, application. The more managed the service, the less OS work you do; identity and data stay yours.  Root  is the account owner, not a daily user. Humans use  IAM Identity Center . Workloads assume roles. Long-lived access keys are not a login method.

  Hero · two sides of the line

 The hypervisor is theirs. The access key on the laptop is yours.
  Lab data · dummy only
 Account  111122223333  · OUs Security / Workloads · hub VPC  10.50.0.0/16  · app VPC  10.51.0.0/16  · SG  sg-web  · NACL  acl-app  · bucket  tc-lab-app-logs  · role  AppEC2Role  · TGW  tgw-lab  · VGW public  203.0.113.60  · on-prem FortiGate WAN  203.0.113.10 . Dummy account ID. Not yours.

## Mental model

   Service style  AWS still owns  You still own

  EC2 in app VPC 10.51.0.0/16  Host, hypervisor, facilities  Guest OS,  sg-app , IAM role, data, patches
  S3  tc-lab-app-logs   Storage plane, durability of the service  Block Public Access, bucket policy, encryption, objects
  Lambda / managed  Runtime host and patching  Code, execution role, secrets, what the function can reach

  The line

  AWS · of the cloud  regions, hardware, hypervisor

- You · in the cloud IAM, data, OS, SG, KMS choices IAM sits on your side. A VPC is not a substitute for identity. ## How to choose Who How they enter 111122223333 Never Human (Priya) IAM Identity Center permission set → temporary creds Root, long-lived IAM user access keys EC2 / app Instance profile AppEC2Role Keys in user-data or ~/.aws Break-glass Root + hardware MFA, offline, rare Shared root password in chat https://111122223333.signin.aws.amazon.com/console Training mock · not live AWS console VPC IAM S3 CloudTrail IAM → Dashboard ### Account 111122223333 · identity hygiene Root MFA Enabled — hardware preferred, not a daily login Root access keys None Human access IAM Identity Center (SSO) — no IAM user keys Workload role AppEC2Role · instance profile Caller check aws sts get-caller-identity Cancel Save IAM is the perimeter. Root is the owner, not a teammate. Training mock. ## Runbook #### Side A — who am I aws sts get-caller-identity . If the ARN is root or a personal IAM user with access keys, stop. Identity Center assumed-role is the expected human path.

- #### Side B — root lock Root: MFA on, no access keys, no daily console. Delete any root keys. Humans get permission sets, not AdministratorAccess pasted on an IAM user.

- #### Side C — prove the split Name one thing AWS patches for you (hypervisor) and one thing you patch (guest OS on the app VPC instance). Write it on the ticket.

  aws cli · dummy 111122223333  aws sts get-caller-identity
# Account: 111122223333
# Arn: arn:aws:sts::111122223333:assumed-role/AWSReservedSSO_SecurityAudit_aabb/priya

aws iam get-account-summary --query 'SummaryMap.AccountMFAEnabled'
# 1

aws iam list-access-keys --user-name root
# do not create these; empty is the proof

## Four failures

### 1 · Root as daily admin

 Every click is unbounded. MFA on root does not make root a person.

### 2 · “AWS was hacked”

 Usually a leaked key or a public bucket. Start with IAM and S3, not a region outage story.

### 3 · VPC as the only perimeter

 A private subnet does not stop a stolen access key from calling  s3:GetObject  on  tc-lab-app-logs .

### 4 · IAM user keys for humans

 They live for years. Identity Center issues temporary credentials. Next lesson is the org; this lesson is the person.

## How to prove it

  Close the ticket only when

 1) Caller identity is not root. 2) Root MFA is on and root keys are absent. 3) You can say of-cloud vs in-cloud for the sick service. 4) You did not “fix” it by creating another long-lived key.

## Traps

   Symptom  Your side  Wrong fix

  Someone listed all buckets  IAM / leaked key  “AWS breach, wait for AWS”
  EC2 CVE on the guest  You patch the AMI / instance  Open a hypervisor ticket
  S3 object public  Bucket policy / ACL / BPA  Blame S3 durability

## Knowledge check

   Judgment items. One best answer. Reasons send you back to the matching section.

       Q1
       Who patches the guest OS on an EC2 in 10.51.0.0/16?

           AWS always
           You — that is in-the-cloud
           The TGW
           GuardDuty

       Correct:  b . Shared responsibility: guest OS is customer.

       Q2
       Root on 111122223333 should be used for…

           Daily console and CLI
           Rare break-glass after MFA, not a teammate login
           Application runtime
           S3 object GET

       Correct:  b . Root is the account owner.

       Q3
       A stolen IAM access key can read S3 even from a private subnet because…

           IAM is the API perimeter, not the VPC edge
           NACLs encrypt objects
           TGW blocks STS
           Root MFA covers every principal

       Correct:  a . Identity vs network.

       Q4
       Preferred human login to this dummy account?

           IAM user access keys in a spreadsheet
           IAM Identity Center (SSO) temporary credentials
           Root password in chat
           Hard-coded keys in user-data

       Correct:  b . Identity Center for humans.

       Q5
       First proof command on any AWS ticket?

           aws sts get-caller-identity
           reboot the instance
           disable CloudTrail
           open 0.0.0.0/0 on sg-web

       Correct:  a . Who are you.

       Q6
       S3 durability of the service is AWS. Public objects are…

           Also AWS’s fault automatically
           Your configuration — in the cloud
           A TGW route
           Fixed by adding a second root

       Correct:  b . Bucket policy / BPA is customer.

       Check answers
       Reset

  AWS security class series:   Shared + IAM  ·  Org / OU  ·  SG vs NACL  ·  Role not key  ·  KMS + Secrets  ·  VPC endpoint  ·  Trail + GuardDuty  ·  TGW hub  ·  S3 public  ·  Interview

## Sources

- AWS Shared Responsibility Model .
- IAM User Guide — IAM roles .

 Related:  AWS session factory  ·  Migration series .

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